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Administrative Law.  Blais v. Rhode Island Airport Corp., 212 
A.3d 604 (R.I. 2019).  The Rhode Island Airport Corporation (RIAC)
must issue a formal order in accordance with the statutory
requirements of the Uniform Aeronautical Regulatory Act (UARA)
to ban an individual from the premises of one of its airports.1  RIAC
could not make a case moot by conditionally lifting a disputed ban
to prevent an individual from entering one of its airports.2
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
RIAC is a “subsidiary public corporation”3 of the Rhode Island 
Commerce Corporation.4 RIAC’s director, Kelly Fredericks 
(Fredericks),5 manages and operates several Rhode Island 
airports.6  Kevin Blais (Blais) purchased a gate key in 2010 to one 
of the airports operated by RIAC and directed by Fredericks—
North Central State Airport (North Central) in Smithfield.7  The 
gate key allowed Blais to store his airplane and access the airfield 
at North Central, and he regularly accessed the airport for several 
years.8  Blais’s behavior during those years led RIAC to issue a no-
trespass letter on February 14, 2014, informing him that he could 
no longer enter the airport.9 
1. Blais v. R.I. Airport Corp., 212 A.3d 604, 618 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id. at 613.






9. Id.  The letter stated: “Please be advised that you are not allowed to
enter the premises of North Central State Airport.  If you ignore the directive, 
you will be deemed a trespasser pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws 
Section 11-44-26 and RIAC will take appropriate legal action.”  Days after 
issuance of the no-trespass letter, Blais entered North Central for a safety 
seminar, and airport police removed him from the premises.  Id. at 608.  
Following that incident, the District Court tried and convicted Blais for 
criminal trespass.  He appealed to the Superior Court, but the case was 
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RIAC scheduled a hearing in June of 2015 to discuss the 
possibility of ending the ban against Blais.10  Ten witnesses 
testified about Blais’ behavior, most testifying that his actions 
“made them feel at best, uncomfortable, and at worst, unsafe.”11  
Based on the testimony, the hearing officer issued a report in 
September 2015 that determined Blais would continue to be banned 
from North Central due to safety concerns.12  On October 8, 2015, 
Fredericks sent Blais a letter, that was allegedly a final order, 
stating that he was banned from entering North Central, but could 
still access other RIAC facilities.13  However, Blais would be able to 
enter North Central in an “aviation emergency.”14  The letter also 
stated that the determination would be reviewed in six months at 
another hearing.15  Attached to the letter was a document labeled 
“Notice of Appeal Rights of Party Aggrieved by Final Order of 
Director,” which notified Blais that under the Administrative 
Procedures Act, he could appeal the order in Superior Court within 
thirty days after the order was mailed.16 
Blais appealed to the Superior Court on November 6, 2015, 
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.17  While the trial court 
did not award such relief, it found that the February 2014 no-
trespass letter and the October 2015 order, which continued the 
dismissed by the Attorney General before the court could decide whether to 
grant a new trial.  Id. 
10. Id. at 608.  Blais did not attend the hearing, but an attorney appeared
on his behalf.  Id. 
11. Id.  The Court described the testimony of witnesses who testified at
the hearing, providing details about eight witnesses who described negative 
encounters with Blais and one witness who felt that Blais’s behavior was 
justified by the way he was treated by others at the airport.  Id. at 609–10. 
12. Id. at 610.
13. Id.
14. Id.  This order stated:
I am writing to advise you that I have adopted the findings, conclusion 
and recommendations of the [hearing officer].  As such, you are 
directed to remain off the premises of the North Central State Airport. 
You may use any of the other Rhode Island Airport Corporation 
Facilities, and may use North Central State Airport in the event of an 
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February 2014 ban, were not valid.18  RIAC’s February 2014 letter 
failed to “state the reasons for the order or provide the requirements 
that needed to be met before the order might be modified,” which is 
required under the Uniform Aeronautical Regulatory Act (UARA)19 
to be a valid final order.20  Because the original February 2014 
letter was invalid and the October 2015 order claimed to extend the 
ban created by the February 2014 letter, the October 2015 order 
was also invalid.21  RIAC petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court (the Court) to issue a writ of certiorari, which the Court 
granted on November 27, 2017.22 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court first determined the standard of review appropriate 
in an administrative appeal.23  The Court stated that it reviews 
questions of law de novo, while deferring to the RIAC hearing 
officer’s findings of fact.24 
As an initial matter, the Court considered whether the case 
was moot, because during the course of the litigation, RIAC had 
issued an order that would allow Blais to enter North Central 
again.25  The Court issued an order on April 4, 2019 asking the 
parties “to advise this Court, within five days of the date of this 
order, of any action pending in any other court that might directly 
or indirectly relate to this appeal, including the relief sought in 
those cases.”26  In response, the parties submitted Blais’s 
complaints, which included “a 2016 administrative appeal in the 
Superior Court, No. KC–2016–0724, and a 2017 civil action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.”27  
Blais claimed that while the instant case was pending, RIAC held 
a hearing and decided to remove the no-trespass order, though that 
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting 1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-4-15).
21. Id. at 610–11.
22. Id. at 611.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 612.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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decision would be reviewed in six months.28  Blais argued that the 
case was not moot because he was not returned to the position he 
was in before the ban; RIAC could decide to ban him again in the 
later hearing.29  Based on these facts, the Court agreed with Blais 
and decided that the case was not moot.30 
The Court then turned to the merits of the case.  The Court 
first addressed whether, as Blais argued, RIAC did not have the 
authority to ban him from North Central without a final order.31  
RIAC presented two arguments to support its belief that a final 
order was unnecessary.32  First, RIAC argued that the UARA only 
gave RIAC authority to issue orders related to “generally applicable 
aeronautical regulation,” and the ban placed on Blais was not an 
aeronautical regulation that would require a formal order.33  The 
Court rejected this argument, finding that the statute does require 
a final order for matters beyond aeronautical regulation, including 
matters of safety and efficiency.34  Second, RIAC argued that if it 
followed the requirements of a final order under the UARA, it would 
make it challenging for RIAC to address time sensitive safety 
issues.35  The Court found that the procedural requirements set 
forth by the UARA would not prevent RIAC from handling 
immediate threats to security because, in those situations, the final 
order requirement could be bypassed.36  Altogether, RIAC failed to 
allege that Blais actually violated a law or regulation and created a 
time sensitive issue that would allow RIAC to remove him without 
issuing a final order.37  The Court concluded that RIAC could not 
ban individuals from its airports without following the 
requirements described in section 1-4-15 of the General Laws.38 
The Court then addressed whether RIAC issued a final order 
to Blais in accordance with the requirements of the UARA.39  The 
28. Id.
29. Id. at 613.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 613–14.
33. Id. at 613.
34. Id. at 614.
35. Id. at 613–14.
36. Id. at 614.
37. Id. at 614–15.
38. Id. at 615.
39. Id.
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Court decided that for the order to be enforceable, RIAC’s director 
needed to state “his or her reasons for the order and state the 
requirements to be met before approval is given or the rule, 
regulation, or order shall be modified or changed.”40  The order 
must also “be mailed to, or served upon, that person” who is the 
subject to the order and it must be “kept on file with the secretary 
of state.”41  The Court found that the February 2014 letter was 
invalid because it did not include the requirements necessary for 
Blais to change the ban, RIAC’s director did not sign the letter, it 
did not give any statutory basis for the ban, and it was not 
presented as a final order from RIAC’s director.42  Although the 
trial court reasoned that the October 2015 order was not valid 
because it extended the invalid February 2014 letter’s ban, the 
Court analyzed the October 2015 order independently to decide 
whether it could be an enforceable order under the statute.43  The 
Court said that although the order might state the reasons for 
imposing the ban, it nonetheless failed to state the requirements 
for modifying or changing the order, which made it invalid under 
the statute.44 RIAC argued that it could not predict the 
circumstances under which it would remove the ban, but the Court 
stated that the statute includes this requirement, so RIAC could 
not ignore it simply because it might be burdensome.45  Because 
neither the 2014 letter nor the 2015 order met all of the 
requirements set forth by the UARA, neither were  enforceable final 
orders.46 
Having determined that RIAC needed to adhere to the 
requirements of the UARA and that it failed to do so, the Court 
addressed RIAC’s final argument that Blais’s claim was barred 
because he failed to timely appeal the February 2014 letter.47  
However, the Court found that the February 2014 letter was not a 
final order, and Blais did appeal the October 2015 purportedly 
“final order” within thirty days, as required by the Administrative 
40. Id. (quoting 1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-4-15).
41. Id. at 616 (quoting 1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-4-11).
42. Id. at 616.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 616–17.
45. Id. at 617.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Procedures Act.48  The Court concluded that RIAC’s final argument 
failed because Blais appealed in a timely fashion and the orders did 
not comport with the requirements of the statute, thus deciding 
that the Superior Court correctly decided that RIAC’s ban was 
unenforceable.49 
COMMENTARY 
Justice Robinson concurred in part and dissented in part from 
the majority’s decision.  Justice Robinson believed that the case was 
moot and the majority’s analysis of the merits of the case was 
unnecessary.50  According to Justice Robinson’s reasoning, since 
RIAC was no longer imposing a ban on Blais, the Court could no 
longer provide him any relief; therefore, the Court should not have 
gone any further into its analysis.51  Justice Robinson noted that 
although the majority relied on an order that supposedly said that 
RIAC’s removal of the ban would be reviewed six months after 
lifting the order, the Court did not receive that order and should 
not have based its decision on documentation that it never saw.52   
Despite determining that the case should be moot, Justice 
Robinson evaluated the majority’s decisions on the merits.53 
Justice Robinson agreed with the majority that RIAC must adhere 
to the requirements of the UARA when issuing a permanent ban, 
but he believed that RIAC may issue a temporary ban without 
meeting the requirements of the statute to protect airport safety.54 
The February 2014 letter and October 2015 order at issue in 
this case were, without question, not final orders under the UARA 
because neither included the necessary elements required by the 
statute.55  The controversy between the majority and the dissent in 
this case turns on whether or not the case was moot and whether 
or not the UARA requirements should be applied to all orders 
banning individuals from RIAC airports.56   
48. Id. at 618.
49. Id.
50. Id. (Robinson J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
51. Id. at 618–19.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 620.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 622.
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RIAC attempted to avoid litigation by lifting the ban on Blais, 
but RIAC nonetheless retained the ability to potentially impose the 
ban again at a later date.57  The majority argued that the case was 
not moot because the potential for future harm did not leave Blais 
in the position he was in prior to the 2014 letter.58  However, 
Justice Robinson argued that the majority was essentially issuing 
an advisory opinion because Blais was no longer banned from North 
Central and the Court could not grant any relief.59  Justice 
Robinson’s understanding of the mootness issue is supported by the 
fact that the Rhode Island Superior Court decided not to grant 
Blais’s request for injunctive or declaratory relief; it simply found 
that the 2014 letter and the 2015 order were invalid.60  Although 
the Court was incapable of granting the relief sought by Blais by 
the time it decided the case, the Court recognized that without 
explaining the requirements of the statute, RIAC was at risk of 
issuing another invalid ban in the future.61  
Justice Robinson’s other point of contention with the majority’s 
opinion was that the majority stated that the requirements of the 
UARA should apply to all orders banning individuals from the 
premises, while Justice Robinson believed that the UARA 
requirements should only apply to permanent bans.62  Justice 
Robinson recognized the letter and order in this particular case as 
permanent bans, but he believed that the Court should have 
differentiated between the requirements for temporary and 
permanent bans.63  According to Justice Robinson, issuing a 
temporary ban to protect the safety and effective operation of the 
airports falls within the authority of RIAC’s director and he or she 
should not have to follow all of the statutory requirements to 
address a time-sensitive safety concern.64  Justice Robinson felt as 
though the majority was “putting form over substance” by expecting 
the RIAC director to comply with the statute in all instances.65  
57. Id. at 613 (majority opinion).
58. Id.
59. See id. at 619 (Robinson J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
60. See id. at 610–11 (majority opinion).
61. Id. at 613.
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However, differentiating between temporary and permanent bans 
raises another question: if statutory requirements are not 
necessary for temporary bans, what are the proper procedures for 
issuing a temporary no-trespass order?  The majority emphasized 
that the statute was written to include all orders “requiring or 
prohibiting certain things to be done,” so it appears that the 
legislature has made it clear that there is no difference in how RIAC 
should handle temporary and permanent bans.66  The majority 
actually seems to agree with Justice Robinson that RIAC could 
“temporarily eject persons from any airport, without issuing a final 
order, for behavior that poses an immediate disturbance or pressing 
threat.”67  It is unclear under what circumstances the Court would 
find that there is enough of a security risk that RIAC could forego 
the requirements of the UARA; however, because there was no 
evidence of a time sensitive security threat in this case, that issue 
would need to be determined at another time. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court held that the Rhode Island Superior Court 
correctly decided that Blais’s case was not moot because RIAC could 
choose to reimpose the ban set forth by the invalid orders.  RIAC’s 
purportedly final orders, in the February 2014 letter and the 
October 2015 order, were invalid because they did not meet the 
UARA’s statutory requirements for a final order. 
Sarah Friedman 
66. Id. at 617 (majority opinion).
67. Id. at 614.
